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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a two-sector imperfect information stochastic model that can be used 
to examine the stabilizing features of fixed versus flexible exchange rates. The analysis makes 
several points. We show that if the monetary a.uthority possesses superior information, a. 
flexible exchange rate will stabilize output in both the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. 
However, if the monetary authority does not possess superior information, the optimal regime 
will depend on the relative magnitudes of domestic versus foreign aggregate shocks, and on 
the importance of sector-specific variability. A fixed exchange rate rule will minimize the 
deviation of output (rom its full information level in tradeables, but will tend to increase the 
output gap in non-tradeables. In general, we find tha.t the optimal regime implies neither a. 
completely fixed nor a completely flexible exchange ra.te. 

" ... supposing that the Common Market countries proceed with their plans for eco­
nomic union, should these countries allow each national currency to fluctuate, or would 
a single currency area be preferable?" 
R. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", 1961. 
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1 Introduction 
It is perhaps surprising that Mundell's question should be as relevant today as it was 30 years 
ago. But the choice of an optimal exchange rate regime in an open economy has remained 
the topic of an ongoing, and unresolved, debate for well over three decades. Since the original 
articles by Mundell {1961} and McKinnon (1963), the issue of what constitutes an optimal 
currency area has been at the core of this debate. With progress accelerating towards a 
European Monetary Union (EMU), this old strand of the literature has been revisited, and the 
arguments first put forth by Mundell and McKinnon have been ta.ken up by both proponents 
and adversaries of the move towards a single currency. 
Traditionally, the concept of a.n optimal currency area applied only to very small and 
highly open economics. According to the earlier a.uthors (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963), 
the key characteristics of an area over which it was optimal to have a single currency (or 
alternatively, a credibly fixed exchange rate) included: (a) symmetry of shocks to different 
regions; (b) relative price flexibility; and, most importantly, (c) high internal geographical 
and inter-sectoral factor mobility. Where shocks were highly asymmetric, prices sticky or 
factor mobility lacking, flexible exchange rates were needed to ensure smooth achievement of 
external and internal balance. 
The more recent literature on the relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
shifted attention away from the role of mobility and symmetry, and focused instead on the rules 
versus discretion debate [Barro and Gordon (1983»), and on the time-inconsistency problem 
associated with discretionary policy-making. Within this framework, the desirability of a fixed 
exchange rate stemmed from the need to tie the hands of the policy maker, hence increasing 
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the credibility of announced policies [Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)J. This strain of the literature 
revolved, therefore, around the credibility gains associated with anchoring the exchange rate 
to an external target. 
Although these two lines of thought are by no means inconsistent, they have often been 
used to defend opposing positions. In this paper, we analyze the choice of an optimal exchange 
rate regime within an analytical framework that can integrate both types of arguments. In 
the Mundell and McKinnon vein, our model highlights the role of informational rigidities and 
sectoral asymmetry of shocks in determining the choice of an exchange rate rule. The paper 
also links to the credibility literature by examining the fixed exchange rate rule as a mechanism 
that allows domestic agents to import the better information structure, and hence, superior 
credibility, of foreign policy makers. In this sense, our arguments parallel those put forth in 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), or Melitz (1988), although we do not consider the inflationary 
bias problem. 
In many regards, OUt paper represents a return to the earlier tradition of examining the 
optimality of a given exchange rate regime from the perspective of stabilizing output [as 
reflected in the papers by Fischer (1977), Gray (1976), or Flood and Marion (1982)J. Building 
on the new classical closed-economy models presented in Lucas (1972 and 1973) and Barro 
(1976), we develop a simple open-economy version that allows us to study the stabilizing 
features of alternative monetary policy rules, which �re linked in turn to particular exchange 
rate regimes. 
An important element of our strategy lies in the introduction of two sectors -tradcables 
and a non-lradcables- into our domestic country model. Beyond its analytical appeal, a two­
sector approach is justified empirically by the importance of the non tradeable sector in many 
economies, and by its fundamental role in governing the behavior of the real exchange rate. 
Many analysts have argued, for example, that the September 1992 exchange rate crisis in 
the ERM was linked to the unsustainable real appreciation of certain currencies, namely the 
Italian lira, the Spanish peseta and, to a less extent, the British pound. This real appreciation, 
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at least in the Italian and Spanish case, was rooted in the behavior of the non· tradeable sector 
[De Gregorio, Giovanninni and Krueger, 1993]. Moreover, by adopting a two-sector model, 
our analysis serves to link the stabilization literature with the long tradition of two-sector 
models in international economics. 
This two-sector approach allows us to emphasize the role of inter-sectoral rigidities and 
asymmetl'y of shocks in determining the optimal choice of an exchange rate regime, and serves 
to link the paper to the strand of existing literature in the Mundell-McKinnon vein. In this 
sense, the paper provides a strong analytical neoclassical framework to the discussion of the 
role of asymmetry, which in our model is rooted in the existence of informational rigidities 
between sectors. 
An interesting implication of our two-sector model is that, depending on the exchange 
rate rule adopted by policy·makers, the domestic information set of participants in tradeables 
and non·tradeables may differ. This, in turn, implies that rules which may stabilize output 
in one sector will fail to do so in another. The introduction of a non-tradeable sector in our 
asymmetric information model hence adds substantial richness to the results, and leads us 
to qualify the standard policy prescriptions regarding the advantages of fixed versus flexible 
rates. 
The analysis makes several general points. First, we show that contrary to what has been 
generally accepted since Mussa (1981), if the monetary authority possesses better information 
on the economy than private agents, a flexible ex<;hange rate will be preferable since it will 
stabilize output in both the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. However, in the more real· 
istic case in which the monetary authority does not possess superior information, the optimal 
regime will depend on the relative magnitudes of domestic versus foreign aggregate shocks, 
and on the importance of sector-specific shocks. Furthermore, it will also depend on the 
weight attached to the tradeable versus the non-tradeable sectors in the policy·maker's ob­
jective function. In particular, we find that while a fixed exchange rate rule will minimize the 
deviation of output from its full information level in tradeables, it will not minimize the output 
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gap in non-tradcables. Rather, this gap will be increased under fixed rates (except in the case 
where domestic aggregate disturbances far outweigh foreign aggregate disturbances). Thus, 
as in Mckinnon (1963) but unlike Frenkel and Aizenman (1982), we find that a fixed-exchange 
rate regime is more advisable in more open economies. 
In general, we find that, for most economies, the optimal exchange rate rule is a mixed 
one -ie. a regime somewhere in between perfectly fixed and perfectly flexible exchange rates. 
This result provides a rational for exchange rate agreements such as the wide-band regime 
now in force in the ERM. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow·s. Section 2 presents the basic two-sector 
imperfect information model. Section 3 discusses the stabilization properties of a flexible 
exchange rate rule. Section 4 analyzes the fixed exchange rate case. Section 5 compares 
the outcomes under both regimes. Section 6 considers the possibility of introducing mixed 
exchange rate rules (neither perfectly fixed nor perfectly flexible). Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2 The Economy 
Our model is essentially a two country version of the Lucas (1973) and Barro (1976) island 
models. We assume that there is a single nondurable commodity produced in two different 
countries: foreign and domestic. The foreign country is � large open economy producing the 
CQmmodity in a single sector. The domestic country is a small open economy that produces 
the commodity in two sectors (T and N). Sector T (tradeables) is open to the rest of the 
world in the sense that foreign agents can trade in that sector, and that supply and demand 
are affected by worldwide shocks. In contrast, only domestic agents are allowed to trade in 
sector N (nontradeables), where supply and demand are not subject to foreign shocksl. 
Agents can visit any one of the markets in a single period. However, they can only visit 
lThe point of this setup is to ensure that informationaJ flows are superior in the foreign economy. The one 
versus two-sector modelling can be interpreted, in a way, as a proxy for the domestic economy having more 
barriers to competition or other sources of informationaJ inefficiencies. 
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one per period. In each market, participants have information about all aggregate domestic 
and international variables with a one period lag, except for the exchange rate which is known 
contemporaneously. They also know the current price of the market in which they participate. 
These assumptions are meant to proxy for the existence of information costs (or other type 
of adjusment costs) associated with intersectoral and international trade. 
We assume that arbitrage insures that the ex-ante distribution of the different prices is 
the same in all three markets. This means that (log) relative prices are expected to be zero 
in all markets. Therefore, ·the price of foreign output converted into domestic currency is 
expected equal to that of domestic output. Consequently, the real exchange rate is a white­
noise variable. 
In each economy, there is a public sector which transfers fiat money in every period to all 
nationals. Money is the only store of value in this economy. Domestic agents are free to' spend 
the money issued by the domestic government in any foreign or domestic sector. Similarly, 
foreign agents can freely spend the money transferred to them by the foreign authority in 
the foreign sector or in the domestic traddeable sector. Foreign trade takes place whenever 
a foreign (domestic) agent decides to spend his real balances in a domestic (foreign) sector. 
This decision, however, must be taken one period in advance. 
Our island model assumptions allow factors to move across sectors and countries. Again, 
factor mobility must be decided one period in advance and the decision cannot be reverted 
within a single period of time. 
2.1 The Foreign Economy 
As in the islands models of Lucas (1973) and Barro (1976) island models, we specify supply 
and demand equations in the foreign economy as a (log) linear function of domestic wealth and 
of the current price relative to the expected next-period price. We assume that the domestic 
economy is small enough to have a· negligible impact on the demand of the foreign country. 
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Supply and demand in the foreign economy are subject to additive real shocks that are 
• I assumed to be infinitely persistent. The supply and demand functIOns have the form: 
I 
�& a� (PI - EPI�lljl) + VI& 
Yo' ii' (P, - EP,:"tli,) + /3 (Nl, + E LlAl,+tli, - EP,:"tli,) + ti,', 
where superscripts sand d indicate supply and demand respectively, and - refers to variables 
of the foreign economy_ Ph MI. Yt and Vt .are prices, money, output and the real shock 
respectively. II denotes a.gents' information set. 
In the above specification we have used the sum of currently available money plus the 
expected next-period money transfer as a proxy for wealth. We have also assumed, without loss 
of generality, that there is no wealth effect on output supply and that there a.re zero-intercepts 
in the supply and demand equations. The latter just implies a particular normalization of the 
units in which output is measured. 
We define the excess demand shock as VI _ v/ - Vt 5 and assume that it follows the 
integrated process: 
where Ut is i.i.d. and normally distributed with zero-mean and va-riance C1�. 
We can write the market clearing price for the foreign sector as 
(1) 
where Q' == a' - ad is the excess supply price elasticity. 
Now, in order to solve for Pt, we have to assume an exogenous process for the money 
supply. For simplicity, we assume that money in the foreign country is generated by a random 
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walk process: 
where ml is i.i.d and normally distributed with zero-mean and variance O'�. mt is also inde-
pendent of tit. 
This assumption implies the following solution for the stochastic difference equation (l): 
(2) 
This solution is independent of the information structure assumed for agents of the foreign 
country. Since there is only one sector in that economy ,there is no possible confusion between 
aggregate and sectoral shocks and, therefore, equilibrium prices and output for the imperfect 
information economy are equivalent to those of a perfect information economy. 
This conclusion would be different if we had assumed a multisector economy for the foreign 
country. In that case, equilibrium prices and output would depend on the relation between 
relative and aggregate shocks. But, since we assumed that the domestic economy is small 
relative to the foreign economy, we would still find no influence of the domestic variables 
or the exchange rate on foreign prices and output. Given that we are interested in anayzing 
output gaps associated with the different exchange·rate regimes in the small domestic economy, 
our single foreign sector assumption seems to be convenient. 
2.2 The Domestic Economy 
The non-tradeables sector (N) of the domestic economy is modeled in the same way as the 
foreign sector. Thus, demand and supply depend on domestic wealth, and on current prices 
relative to future expected prices. However, supply and demand depend also on a sector-
- 13 -
specific relative shock (,,(N)): 
Nt = a' (P,(N) - EP,+dI,(N)) + v,' + ,;(N) (3) 
Nt = a' (P,(N) - EP,+dI,(N)) + t3 (M, + EIlM,+dI,(N) - EP,+dI,(N)) 
(4) 
where Nt is output in the domestic nontradeables sector, V, == vt-vt is the domestic aggregate 
excess demand shock and fAN) == (.t(N) - f:(N) is the sectoral excess demand shock. 
The tradeables sector (T) incorporates two differences with respect to the non-tradeables 
sector. First, since foreign agents have access to that sector, output demand depends also 
on foreign wealth. Second, in addition to a domestic aggregate shock and a sectoral shock, 
output demand and supply are affected by the international (foreign) shock: 
Tt = a' (P,(T) - EP,+dI,(T)) + v,' + ,;(T) + ii,' 
T,' = a' (P,(T) - EP,+dI,(T)) + t3(M, + EIlM,+dI,(T) - EP,+dI,(T)) 
+ 1 (if, + EIlM,+dJ,(T) - EF,+dI,(T)) + v� + ,�(T) + v.', 
(5) 
(6) 
where "y is the foreign wealth elasticity of domestic demand. For simplicity, we assume that 
this elasticity is equal to the wealth elasticity in the foreign country (i.e. 1=/3)2. 
As for the foreign economy, we assume that the domestic excess demand shock follows the 
random walk process Vt = V!_l + Ut where Ut is an i.i.d normal random variable with zero 
mean and variance u� . The sectoral shocks are i.i.d. normal random variables with zero mean 
and variance u� and satisfy ft(N) = -ft{T). 
Equating demand and supply in sector N reveals that the market clearing price must 
2Notice that since we have assumed ex-ante arbitrage, expected next period prices must be equal in all 
three sectors when converted into the same currency. That is why the real exchange rate does not appear 
directly in equation (6). 
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satisfy: 
crP,(N) = (cr - (3)EP,+dI,(N) + (3(M, + E6M,+dI,(N» + v, + ,,(N). (7) 
Similarly, for sedor T: 
crP,(T) = (cr - (3)EP,+dI,(T) + (3(M, + E6M,+dI,(T» + v, + ,,(T). (8) 
No foreign variable appears in equations (7) and (8). Prices and <;>utput can be affeded by 
foreign variables only if those variables help to forecast future money balances. 
2.3 The Exchange Rate 
Since we have assumed that expected future (log) relative prices are zero in all markets, 
Purchasing Power Parity must hold ex·ante. Therefore, we can define the exchange rate (e() 
in the economy as the domestic price of the tradea.bles sector relative to the foreign price (as 
in most of the two-sector monetary models): e(t) == P,(T) - Pt. 
This definition of the exchange rate implies that PPP verifies also ex·post for tradeable 
goods. In principle, since instantaneous arbitrage is not possible, there is no reason to believe 
that PPP holds period by period. Since we are interested in analyzing the effeds of monetary 
policy rules implied by different exchange rate regimes, this definition of the exchange rate' 
seems to be not only practical, but also reasonable. As long as PPP holds ex·ante, the 
(fixed exchange rate) money rule that attempts to estabilise Pt(T) - Pt can be realistically 
reinterpreted as an exchange rate policy that targets a specific parity but permits stationary 
deviations around it. 
The implementation of a fixed exchange rate money rule requires that monetary authorities 
be able to react instantaneously to incipient deviations of the prevailing exchange rate. Our 
assumptions allow us to model this behavior in a rather simple way. Instead of complicating 
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considerably the model by considering simultaneously the currency markets and the good 
markets, we just need to assume that there exists an international agency that continuously 
provides world-wide relative prices of the tradeable good. 
Flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes will only differ in that they imply different money 
rules. Under a flexible rule, money follows an exogenous stochastic process (as in the foreign 
economy); under a fixed regime, money follows an endogenous process such that the expression 
(P,(T) = P,) becomes a solution of equation (8). 
3 Flexible Exchange Rates 
We begin by examining the flexible exchange rate case. First, we obtain expressions for 
equilibrium output and prices under perfect information. We then analyze the imperfect 
information case. 
Throughout the section, we assume for simplicity that the money supply follows an exoge­
nous process similar to that of the foreign money supply: 
(9) 
where m! is i.i.d, N(O,O"�) and independent of UI and �t(T). 
3.1 Perfect Current Information 
Suppose agents know all aggrega.te and sectoral variables contemporaneously. Then, for a.ll 
agents: EtAft+t = Aft. Using the method of undetermined coefficients we find that from 
equations (7) and (8) equilibrium sectoral prices are then given by: 
1 1 
P,(N) = M, + {jv, + �,,(N) 
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(10) 
and 
1 1 
P,(T) = M, + pV' + ;,,(T) (11) 
Using expressions (lO) and (11) and defining the aggregate domestic price (Pt) as a. simple 
geometric average of the sectoral prices, we obtain that aggregate prices resemble those found 
for the foreign economy. Similarly, we also obtain that relative prices satisfy Et(P'+l(N) -
Pf+l(T» = 0, as is required· by our no-arbitrage assumption. 
Calculating expected next period prices and substituting them into the supply equations 
(5) and (3) yields the following expressions for the equilibrium levels of output: 
(12) 
and 
(13) 
where superscript F stands for full information outcome. Not surprisingly, under full informar 
tion, money and the exchange rate have no effect on equilibrium output. Finally, comparing 
equations (2) and (11) we find that under perfect information, the exchange rate follows an 
integrated process: 
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3.2 Imperfect Current Information 
Assume now that agents have current information only on the exchange rate and on the price 
of the sedor where they are located. Since money follows an exogenous process which does 
not depend on international data, a natural guess for the equilibrium price of sector N is: 
P,(N) = C,M,_, + C,m, + C3v,_, + C,u, + C",(N). (14) 
According to equation (7), this proposed solution implies that by observing the current price, 
agents who are trading in sector N are able to infer a linear combination of the aggregate 
real and nominal shocks, and the sectoral shock. By projecting each of those shocks on that 
linear combination and the lagged macro-variables, they form the best linear predictors of 
the shocks. Using those linear predictors when calculating EP1+dJ1(N) and EMI+1III(N) in 
equation (7), and relying on the method of undetermined coeficients we find that: 
P,(N) M,_, + [8m + 8. + �(I - 8m - 8.)] [m, + �(u, + ',(N))] + ,,(N) 
I 
+ fjv,-" (15) 
where 
8m = f32q� fJ2q� + q� + q; 
and 
(7' 8. = • fJ2q� + q� + qt· 
Similarly, the equilibrium price for sector T is 
P,(T) M,_, + [Om + O. + �(I - Om - 8.)] [m, + �(,,' + ,,(T))] + ,,(T) 
I + fjv,-,. (16) 
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Substituting expressions (15) and (16) into the supply equations (3) and (5), and substract­
ing equations (12) and (13) respectively, yields an expression for the deviations of output from 
its full information level in each sector: 
(17) 
(18) 
As in the standard closed-economy island models, we find that unexpected money growth has 
a real effect in both sectors and that, therefore, the Phillips curve has a finite slope. This 
result arises from agents' confusion between the aggregate shock (mt + �ud and the sector­
specific shocks ft. The slope of the Phillips curve, (1 - Om - 0,,), is given by the proportion of 
total aggregate uncertainty that is due to sectoral shocks. 
The exogenous money rule
· 
we have "assumed implies that the slope of the Phillips curve for 
both sectors is independent of the foreign variables and the exchange rate. This is so because 
those foreign variable add no information that could be used in forecasting money and prices. 
We can also show, by comparing expression (2) and (16) , that as in the full informa.tion case 
the exchange rate follows an integrated process. 
3.3 Monetary Authority has Superior Information 
As in the standard closed economy Barro model, assuming that the authority has superior 
information about the aggregate variables implies that, by following an autonomous money 
rule, the policy-maker is able to lead the economy to its full information equilibrium. 
To see this, assume that the monetary authority is able to observe contemporaneouly the 
aggregate real domestic shock Vt. Then consider the contemporaneous feedback rule: 
(19) 
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One can show that by using this money rule, the monetary authority is minimizing the variance 
of the aggregate shocks in this economy for any given value of u;'. FUrthermore, if the authority 
is able to control mt by setting u! :;; 0, he can push aggregate variability to zero, eliminating 
any possible confusion between aggregate and sectoral shocks ((1 - Om - Oil. :;; 0)). In this 
case, from equations (17) and (18) we can see that equilibrium output corresponds to that 
obtained under full current information. 
The equilibrium price for seelor T is in this case given by: 
1 
P.(T) � M + i3(v.-. + <.(T)). (20) 
We can now calculate the equilibrium level for the exchange rate when policy makers have 
perfect contemporaneous aggregate information and follow the optimal money rule. Com· 
billing the expression for equilibrium prices in the foreign sector (equation (2)) and that for 
sector T (equation (20)) implies that the exchange rate is time variant and follows an inte· 
grated process. 
In this simple economy, if monetary authorities possess full current information about 
aggregate variables, it is optimal to set a monetary policy that implies flexible exchange rates. 
This is because a better informed policymaker can eliminate the confusion between sectoral 
and aggregate shocks by setting a money rule which is independent of foreign variables. 
This result contrasts with the ideas proposed by Mussa (1981), who claims that a fixed 
exchange rate regime is superior to a flexible one when policy makers are be"tter informed than 
private agents about the value of the fundamental exchange rate. In our set-up, deviations 
from fundamentals are always transitory and independent of the exchange rate regime in 
force. Instead, the output gap is caused by agents's confusion between sectoral and aggregate 
uncertainty. Policy makers who posses better aggregate information can solve that confussion 
only by implementing an autonomus money rule which incoporates such information. That 
monetary autonomy is incompatible with fixed exchange rates. 
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In any case, the assumption that the monetary authorities possess superior information 
is not too appealing. It is, hence, more interesting to continue analysing the case in which 
monetary authorities posses the same aggregate information as private agents. We will study 
now the fixed exchange rate case. 
4 Fixed exchange rates 
Under a credible fixed-exchange rate regime, the money supply in the 10mestic economy must 
follow an endogenous process that sets the equilibrium price of the domestic tradeable sector 
equal to that of the foreign sector 3. Thus we require Aft + �Vt to be the solution of the 
stochastic difference equation (8). 
Using again the method of undetermined coefficients we find that Pt ;:;; Pt(T) is the solution 
to equation (8) when the money supply satifies the condition: 
• 1 
M, + ELl.M,+III,(T) = P, - p(v, + <,(T)), 
where Pt is defined by expresion (2). 
Condition (21) implies that the domestic money supply follows the process: 
- 1 AI, = P, - p(v, + <,(T) + <,_,(T)). 
(21) 
(22) 
The money rule is equivalent to a contempora.neous feedba.ck rule where money growth depends 
on foreign shocks, the domestic real aggregate shock and the sectoral shock in tradeables. Since 
the monetary authority only obtains information about the relevant variables with one period 
lag -except for the exchange rate, which is known contemporaneously-, that money rule is 
not directly implementable. By reacting to deviations of the exchange rate from its target, 
3Th rough this discussion we are assuming without loss of generality that the the fixed exchange rate is 
equal to l. 
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however, the monetary authority is indirectly implementing the rule expressed by equation 
(22). 
We are now ready to obtain equilibrium output and prices for the domestic economy. 
4.1 The Tradeables Sector 
We have already seen that the equilibrium price is 
Then 
- - 1 P,{T) = P, = M, + t/)'. 
EP,+dJ,{T) = EP,+dJ,{T) = P,{T) = P,{T), 
(23) 
(24) 
which implies that, from the specification of the output supply equation, output is equal to 
(25) 
This is equivalent to the full information solution when money follows the stochastic process 
(22)·. 
By making the domestic price equal to the foreign one, agents are are able to use the 
better predictability of the latter. Thus, the fixed exchange rate regime is able to stabilize the 
tradeable sector completely by allowing agents participating in sector T to import the same 
information that makes the foreign economy able to attain the full information equilibrium. 
Although this result is grounded in a different rationale, it resembles that put forth by Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1988) and other recent literature on the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
4Notice that the full information solution is different to that corresponding to the random walk money rule. 
However the difference does not depend 011 money growth and has zero mean. Therefore that discrepancy is 
irrelevant for the purpose of this paper. 
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4.2 The Non-Tradeables Sector 
Substituting the money rule (22) into equation (7) and using once again the method of unde-
termined coefficients, we find that the solution for the equilibrium price of sector N is: 
P,(N) A:!<-I + [ex: (3 (\ - 0 .. - 0,) + �] [m, + �u, + �("(N) - ',(T))] 
+ �V<-l (26) 
and that equilibrium output is given by: 
N, ex,! (\ - 0 .. - 0,) [m, + �u, + �(,,(N) - ,,(T))] 
+ v:+€:(N), (27) 
where 
and 
Those results indicate that although the fixed exchange rate regime is able to stabilize sector T, 
the equilibrium level of output for the nontradeable sector is not equal to the full information 
solution. We obtain a Phillips curve relation in sedor N, which arises because agents cannot 
completely separate unanticipated price movements into relative and absolute components. 
However, there arc two differences between this result and that obtained with flexible rates. 
First, the relevant aggregate variability is that of the foreign economy. Second, asumming that 
b � p, the impact of the sector specific variability on total uncertainty is about 4 times higher 
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than under flexible exchange rates. This effect is caused by the endogenous process followed 
by the domestic money supply which incorporates the response to the relative shocks and that 
adds up t.o the direct effect of these shocks on total uncertainty. 
In the next section we compare the output gap for this sector under the flexible and the 
fixed exchange rate regimes. 
5 Comparing Exchange Rate Regimes 
The usual way to compare the stabilizing properties of each exchange-rate regime is by eval­
uating the squared deviation of output from its full information level. 
For the flexible exchange rate regime} this calculation yields: 
(28) 
where 
(29) 
Similarly, for the fixed exchange rate regime, we find that: 
(30) 
where 
(31) 
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and 
E(T, - Tt)' = o. (32) 
These results suggest that, while the fixed exchange rate regime eliminates the output gap for 
the tradeables seclor, it can increase the output gap for the non·tradeables sector. Assuming 
that j; :::! {3, the difference between the output gap for nontradeables under flexible and fixed 
exchange rates depends on �he magnitude of the sectoral shifts, and of the domestic and 
foreign aggregate shocks. Under the fixed exchange rale regime; the relevant aggregate shock 
is the foreign shock; under the flexible exchange rate regi�e it is the domestic one that is 
relevant. On the other hand, the impact of the sectoral shock on total uncertainty is four 
times higher under fixed exchange r�tes that under free floating. Therefore, if O'� is not much 
smaller than O'"� I the fixed exchange rate regime will introduce a larger output gap in the 
nontradeables sector than the flexible one. The reason for this is that the domestic money 
supply incorporates responses to the relative shocks, which increase the unpredictability of 
future money supply and prices in sector N. The additional uncertainty decreases the ability 
of agents in sector N to distinguish between sectoral and aggregate shocks and, therefore, 
increases the deviation of output from its full information level. 
Hence, if aggregate real variability is not much larger in the domestic than in the foreign 
country, and if the non tradeable sector is relatively· important in the economy, the fixed 
exchange ratc regime has poor stabilizing properties. In this case, policies oriented to decrease 
domestic nominal volatility under flexible exchange rates are superior. Conversely, in highly 
open economies with unstable real sectors, a fixed exchange rate regime is particularly useful 
for stabilizing production. 
However, extreme exchange rate rules (perfectly fixed or perfectly flexible) need not be 
the only solution. Perhaps, some kind of mixed exchange rate rule could improve, under some 
circumstances, the stabilizing properties of either extreme regime. This will be ana.lyzed in 
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the next section. 
6 Mixed Exchange-Rate Rules 
We model intermediate exchange rate regimes as the processes resulting from allowing the 
domestic central bank to decide in each period whether to follow a fixed exchange rate policy 
that implies an endogenous money rule, or to employ an autonomous money rule that implies 
a flexible exchange rate. We assume, for simplicity. that this decision is taken based on 
exogenous probabilities. 
Assume that at every period, with probability P, the monetary authority surrenders its 
autonomy and follows a fixed exchange rate policy. With probability (1 - p) the monetary 
policy follows the simple process Mj = Mj_1 + mj. Since we focus on the case in which mone-
tary authorities do not posses superior aggregate information, other conceivable autonomous 
money rules would not produce different results. 
In a particular market J (J = N,T), agents' expectations about the current value of 
money supply are given by: 
- 1 E(M,II,(J)) = (I - p)E(M'_1 + mdI,(J)) + pE(P, - 73(v, + €,(T) + €'_I(T))II,(J)). 
Therefore, p (0 ::; p::; 1) can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of credibility of the 
fixed exchange-rate regime. Alternatively, 1 -P can be interpreted as a measure of the degree 
of exchange rate flexibility that the monetary authority is willing to accept. 
In the appendix, we show that the deviation of output from its full information level in 
the tradeables sector under a mixed rule is given by: 
Q' T, - T,F = (I - p)- {(I - Om - O.)({3m, + u,) - (Om + O.)€,(T)}. 
Q 
(33) 
Since agents who trade in sector T know the equilibrium price in the foreign country there 
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is no possible confussion between domestic and foreign shocks. Thus, the information gap 
in this sector is caused completely by the confusion between domestic aggregate and sectoral 
shocks, which arises when there exists a positive degree of autonomy in the domestic monetary 
policy. Consequently, for this mixed money rule with p # 1, the slope of the Phillips curve is 
not zero, but only domestic unexpected money growth affects output. 
The expected squared deviation of output in the tradeables sector is: 
£(T, _1:F)' = (I -p)' � �. . ( ') ' " t a O'� + 0'; (34) 
The output gap for the mixed rule is, not surprisingly, a monotonic function of the 
exchange-rate flexibility parameter p. The closer the rule is to that of a fixed exchange rate 
(p:::: 1), the closer the equilibrium output is to the full information solution. Conversely, the 
higher the degree of monetary autonomy, the more important the confusion between aggregate 
and sectoral shocks and, consequently, the higher the output gap. 
In the appendix, we also show that under the mixed rule, the deviation of output from its 
full information level in non-tradeables is: 
where 
N, - N; = � {(I -H)[(I -p)({3m, + " , ) + p (�) (�m, + ;;,)] 
(I + p)H,,(N)), 
(I + p)',,: I-H= , . 
(I - p),,,� + p'''i (�) + (I + p)',,; 
(35) 
(36) 
In the nontradeables sector, the mixed rule increases the sources of uncertainty by including 
foreign and domestic contemporaneous shocks in the money rule. Agents are unable to dis­
tinguish between aggregate domestic and foreign shocks, and between aggregate and sector 
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specific shocks. As long as the slope of the Phillips curve is the proportion of total aggregate 
uncertainty due to sector specific shocks, both domestic and foreign money shocks will have 
effects on output in the nontradeables sector. 
In order to analyze the stabilizing properties of the mixed exchange�rate rule for the 
non tradeable sector, we compute the squared expected deviation of output: 
(37) 
Simple inspection of equation (37) shows that a higher p (lower exchange-rate flexibility) 
increases the weight attached to both sector-specific and foreign aggregate uncertainty, while 
reducing the weight of aggregate domestic variability. If a� is large enough relative to (7�, 
an increase in p will increase both sector�specific and aggregate variability. Therefore, total 
varia.bility will be unambigously higher and the output gap will be larger. 
If domestic aggregate variability is larger than foreign aggregate variability, as the money 
rule moves closer to a fixed exchange rate regime (as p goes to 1), we observe two different 
counteracting effects. On the one hand, a higher p implies a higher response to sector specific 
shocks, and hence an increase in sectoral variability. On the other, a higher p increases the 
weight attached to the foreign shock component of aggregate variability, while reducing the 
importance of the domestic part. The net effect on total variability will depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the aggregate shocks (both domestic and foreign) and of the sector�specific 
shocks, as well as on the initial value for p. Therefore, in general, the effect of tightening the 
exchange rate regime on the output gap will be parameter-specific. 
The determinants of the output gap are illustrated in figures la and Ib, which present the 
output gap in the nontradeables sector as a function of the exchange-rate flexibility parameter 
(p), for different values of the foreign aggregate and the sector-specific variability parameters 
relative to domestic aggregate variability. The graphs show that, for high values of aA relative 
to a� , the output gap in non-tradeables is an increasing function of p. In this case, the optimal 
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regime is one characterized by completely flexible exchange rates (p = 0). However, for small 
values of the foreign shock variance, the fixed exhange rate regime (p = 1) leads to an output 
gap which is smaller than that resulting under a flexible exchange rate regime. Moreover, if 
the variance of the foreign shocks is smaller than the variance of aggregate domestic shocks, 
the output gap is S-shaped (for small sectoral variances as in figure La) or V-shaped (for high 
sectoral variances as in figure I.b). 
The total output gap is the sum of the gap in tradeables and the gap in nontradeables. 
A fixed exchange rate will minimize this gap for tradeables, but at the expense of likely 
increasing the deviation from full information output in nontradeables. The optimal degree 
of flexibility (the optimal p) will depend on: (a) the parameters of the model -specifically 
on the relative magnitudes of foreign versus domestic aggregate shocks, and of sector-specific 
versus aggregate variance; and (b) on the weight given to each sector within the policymaker's 
objective function. 
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the total output gap for different values of foreign aggregate 
variability under the realistic assumption that each sector is weighted evenly in policymaker's 
preferences. Those graphs show that the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility does 
not correspond to the extreme regime solutions (p=O or p=l) for a wide range of parameter 
values. The higher (lower) the foreign aggregate variance and the less (more) stable the anchor 
country, the closer the optimal regime is to the flexible (fixed) exchange rate solution. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the stabilizing properties of alternative exchange rate regimes in a 
two-sector imperfect information model. The results show that in such a setting the best 
choice of exchange rate rule will generally be a mixed-one -neither a perfectly fixed nor a free 
floating regime appear optimal. 
The two-sector approach is crucial to the results. In our two-sector model, different ex-
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change rate regimes have different implications for the ability of economic agents to forecast 
the future path of money and prices. In particular, the exchange rate rule affects the informa­
tion available to market participants in the tradeable and nantradcable sectors. By importing 
the better predictability of foreign prices, a fixed exchange rate rule allows market participants 
in tradeables. to separate out the cffects of aggregate and sector-specific shocks. As a result, 
we find that a fixed exchange rate rule completely stabilizes o�tput in the tradeable sector. A 
fixed rate regime, however, does not minimize the output gap in non-tradeables, even in the 
case where foreign aggregate varia.nce is substantially smaller than domestic aggregate vari­
ance. This is because a fixed-exchange rate rule augments the uncertainty facing participants 
in the nontradeables market, by magnifying the impact of relative shifts and accentuating 
agents' confusion. 
In general, we find that the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility depends on specific­
parameter values, and in particular, on the relative sizes of domestic versus foreign distur­
bances, and of sector-specific versus aggregate variances. While this parameter-specificity 
may reduce somewhat the appeal of the results, it is nevertheless quite common to the whole 
literature that analyzes the relative merits of fixed versus flexible regimes [see, for example, 
Flood (1979)J, and is to be expected given the complexity of the model. 
On the whole, our conclusions suggest that economies with a relatively large component of 
industries closed to international competition (or subject to intersectoral rigidities) are more 
likely to prefer exchange rate regimes that involve some degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
Nevertheless, if those economies suffer from a rela.tively high level of aggrega.te variability, 
free fioating is not the optimal regime as they would prefer to adopt money rules which limit 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
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APPENDIX 
DERIVATION OF EQUILIBRIUM PRICES AND OUTPUT 
UNDER THE MIXED EXCHANGE- RATE REGIME 
I) THE TRADEABLES SECTOR 
Under the mixed regime, money supply in period t can be written as 
M, = pM(" + (I - p)M(', (38) 
where Alt and Aft.: are the realizations of the money supply processes corresponding to the 
flexible exchange rate regime (defined inequation 9) and the free floating regime (defined in 
equation 22) respectively. Expected money growth under process (22) is: 
(39) 
Then, according to equation (8), equilibrium prices must satisfy: 
oP,(T) = (0 - P)EP,+dI,(T) + P [PM(" + (I - p)�(' + P�" -I(T)l + v, + ,,(T). (40) 
Now I guess the solution 
P,(T) = pP("(T) + (I - p)P('(T), (41 ) 
where pr(T) and P/,(T) are the equilibrium prices corresponding to the pure fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes respectively. Those equilibrium prices are defined by equa.tions 
(16) and (23).  Then, substituing (41) into (40) yields 
o [pP/"(T) + ( 1 - p)p/'(T)] = (0 - P) [pP/"(T) + (1 - p)EP,�, II,(T)] 
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+ f3 [PMfr + (1 - p)Mf' + P�" -'(T)l + v, + ,,(T). 
Arranging terms, it holds that 
oP/,(T) ; (0 - (3)EPf;.lI,(T) + f3M!' + v, + ,,(T), 
which is consitent with equation (7). Therefore, the equilibrium price for sector T is given by 
expression (41). 
Now, from expressions (5) and (41), it is immediate to see that equilibrium output is given 
by 
T, ; pT/, + (1 - p)T!', 
where T/Z: and rp are the quilibrium output solutions corresponding to the flexible and the 
fixed exchange rate regimes, respectively. 
Therefore, output deviation from its full information level under the mixed exchange rate 
regime is 
T, - T,F ; p [Tfr - (Tfrt] + (1 - p) [Tf' - (Tf't] ; (1 - p) [T," - (T,'')F] 
0' ; ( 1  - p)- [(1 - Om - (f3m, + u,) - (Om + 8.),,(T)[ , (42) 
o 
where F superscripts stand for full information output. 
2) THE NON-TRADEABLES SECTOR 
Under the mixed exchange rate regime, equation (7) becomes 
oP,(N) ; (a - (3)EP,+dI,(N) + f3 [PM!r + ( 1  - p)M/' + P�" -'(T)l + v, + ,,(N). (43) 
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Using the condition « T) = -« N), this implies that 
"P,(N) = (" - ,8)EP,+dl,(N) + ,8p [M. + iv, - �v'l 
+ ,8(1 - p)(M,_. + m,) + v, + <,(N)(I + pl. 
Now, guess the solution 
P,(N) 
Then, the expected future price is 
EP,+. II,(N) TI.M,_. + TI.Em,II,(N) + TI,v,_. + TI,Eu,II,(N) 
(44) 
(45) 
+ TI,M,_. + TI,Em,II,(N) + TI,v,_. + TI,Eu, II,(N). (46) 
Since the sector prices are known at period t ,  agents observe G == Il2m! + 114ut + Il6mj + 
IlSUt + Il9ft{N) . . Therefore, 
Em,jI,(N) II2ui G IIiui + n�l7� + nlO"� + n�O': + n�O': 
Eii,II,(N) n40'� G rr�ol + rr�O'"J + Illa;' + II§q� + n�q: 
Em,II,(N) Il60';' G rr�O'l + Il�O'� + n�O'! + II�O"� + II�O'; 
Eu,jI,(N) IIsO'! G fIiul + IIluz + IIiu;' + II�O'; + JI§O'; (47) 
Substituing (47) into (46) and (46) into (45) we can use the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients to obtain the following expression for equilibrium prices in sector N: 
P,(N) 
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+ 1'. [(a - P)(I - H) + Pl (m, + ';fi,) a P 
+ I: p [(a _ P)(I - H) + Pl (m, + �U') 
1 + P I + --;;- [(a - P)(I - H) + Pl {j,,(N), 
where II is defined in expression (36). 
This expression implies that the expected next period price level is 
[ •  I .  I - p I - p I + p 1 EP'+l II,(N) = p(1 - H) m, + pU, + -p-m, + fjpu, + fjp,,(N) 
(48) 
(49) 
Substituing equations (48) and (49) into equation (3) we find that equilibrium output in the 
non-tradeables sector is 
N, = a,! H [p(m, + �fi') + (I - p)(m, + �u.) + (I + P)�" (N)l 
+ v; + ,;(N) 
The full information solution of expression (45) is 
(50) 
. I I ,,(N) P,(N) = P(M'_1 + m, + 73"') + (I - P)(M,_, + m, + {jv,) + (I + p)-p-, (51) 
which implies the following full information solution for output 
N; = � (I + p),,(N) + v; + ,;(N). (52) 
Therefore, otuput deviation from the full inforrnaton level for the sector of non-tradeables is 
a' { (P) . N, - N; -;- (I - H)[(I - p)(pm, + u,) + p p (pm, + fi,)l 
- (l + p)H,,(N») . (53) 
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